Recent corporate scandals have led to new governance rules by the United States Congress as well as by stock exchanges. This study examines the changes in corporate governance practices during [2001][2002][2003][2004][2005], which covers the period before and after the new regulations. We analyze a comprehensive set of 64 governance attributes for more than 5,200 firms. Our findings indicate that corporate governance practices beyond those mandated by new regulations changed substantially over this period. After controlling for size and industry a positive and significant relation between governance and firm value is found. We find that new regulations are associated with higher firm value for firms that adopted the regulations prior to them being mandated. In this sense our findings suggest that the new regulations did target relevant governance attributes. However, the analysis also indicates that the markets were already rewarding firms that had better governance. Finally, we find that the positive relationship between governance attributes not mandated by regulations and firm value continues even in the post-regulatory period which supports the argument of the impact of quality of governance on firm value.
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Did New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes?
Corporate governance mechanisms have been broadly classified as either internal or external. Internal mechanisms primarily include issues related to the board of directors and the equity ownership structure of the firm while external mechanisms include the market for corporate control and the legal/regulatory structure. Due to the recent corporate governance scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, it was believed that aspects of both internal and external governance mechanisms failed and therefore new governance rules were mandated by the U.S.
Congress and stock exchanges to improve the quality of corporate governance. 1 The new regulations have resulted in much debate concerning their costs and benefits and whether they were needed or if market forces could efficiently address the issues. This study examines the relevance of the new governance regulations.
The main changes imposed by Congress in late 2002 through the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation (SOX) were meant to strengthen financial disclosure and internal governance mechanisms. These specifically include new rules for accounting firms, financial analysts, corporate officers, and directors. Additional responsibility is placed on corporate officers and directors with increased penalties for corporate fraud. In addition to SOX, stock exchanges mandated their own rules that were approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission in November 2003. The new rules impact several areas of the corporate governance mechanism. A key requirement is that boards should have majority independent directors with a more elaborate definition of independence. Also, the audit, compensation, and nominating committees must consist of only independent directors. Furthermore, the audit committee members must be "financially literate" as described in the rules. Additionally, the board is required to hold regular executive sessions without management being present. With few exceptions, firms were expected to incorporate these changes, with full compliance expected by the end of 2004.
This paper examines the importance of corporate governance and how it varies across firm attributes, and additionally, how this relation has changed over the recent past. In particular, we examine the association between these new regulations and firm value. In order to examine the relevance of new regulations, we construct an index that captures the governance provisions that were targeted by new regulations. Our index is based on corporate governance attributes provided by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). ISS is one of the most influential shareholder advisory firms and provides governance data to the market for the purpose of equity research, risk management, legal and compliance issues, credit analysis and investments. Most previous academic studies have used governance provisions provided by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) that covers a limited number of governance attributes.
ISS covers a much larger set of companies and provides 64 governance attributes that go far beyond the anti-takeover provisions addressed by the IRRC metrics. 2 We are able to study a much wider set of governance provisions and also specifically focus on the ones targeted by new regulations. Our cross-sectional study examines the relation between governance and valuation for the period 2001-2005 using a sample of as many as 5,259 firms.
Firms differ in their operations and other characteristics that could impact governance attributes. Therefore, before examining the impact of governance changes over time, we evaluate the differences in governance across firm size and industries. We find statistically significant differences in governance across firm size and industries. Smaller firms have much lower governance scores than larger firms. After controlling for size and industry, we still find a positive and significant relation between governance and value. Governance mechanisms associated with board structure, audit, executive and director compensation, state of incorporation, ownership and progressive practices are found to be significant in explaining firm value. However, governance attributes associated with company charter and by-laws and director education are not significant. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) and Brown and Caylor (2005) cast doubt on the benefits of creating a very large number of governance provisions and point out that only a specific group of governance attributes are important to firm value. Our findings are consistent with these arguments.
The main focus of the study is to determine whether the provisions imposed by the new regulations have a significant relation with firm value. Our results show that large and significant cross-sectional differences existed in the governance attributes that were later mandated. We find that there are statistically significant cross-sectional differences in governance at the firm and the industry level. For example, smaller firms have very different governance structures than larger firms. Therefore, adopting the new regulations will be far more expensive for smaller firms than larger firms. This raises the question of whether the onesize-fits-all approach to governance is appropriate. After controlling for size and industry we find that the new regulations mandated by Congress and exchanges were associated with higher firm value. The firm value impact is particularly strong for firms that adopted the new governance attributes voluntarily, before the regulations were mandatory. The results are statistically and economically significant. In this sense our findings suggest that the new regulations did target relevant governance attributes. However, the analysis also indicates that the markets were already doing their job and rewarding firms that had overall stronger governance. After the new rules were put in effect, the cross-sectional differences between the governance mechanisms covered by the new regulations and firm value did not persist but the results did show that better governance is still being rewarded. Therefore, it is not clear that new regulations were needed or whether market mechanisms would have forced stronger governance anyway. It should be recognized that the main interest of regulators is in protecting investors, and increasing transparency and accountability. Therefore, their interest is not just on firm value but on broader issues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I reviews the related literature.
Section II discusses the governance attributes studied in the paper and the attributes mandated by new regulations. Section III describes the data and methodology. Section IV shows the relation between governance and firm value; Section V reports the results of the relation between new regulations and firm value; and Section VI concludes.
I. Related Literature
The paper starts by examining the relation between governance and valuation and ends by specifically focusing on the new regulations. Therefore, we discuss two strands of academic literature. The first deals with the relation between governance and firm performance, and the second specifically examines the new regulations.
The internal governance mechanisms that have received considerable attention in the literature are issues related to the board of directors and equity ownership. The board of directors is expected to monitor management and represent the interests of shareholders. They are responsible for hiring, firing, and compensation. However, as Denis and McConnell (2003) discuss, the board itself can have conflicts and may not represent the interests of shareholders.
The U.S. evidence on the relation between board structure and firm performance is that board composition is not related to performance and board size is negatively related to performance.
3 Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002) examine the impact of corporate governance changes in the U.K., and find that after the issuance of the Cadbury recommendations, CEO turnover increased and the relationship between turnover and performance became stronger, particularly for firms that adopted the new guidelines.
4 Gompers, Ishi and Metric (2003) , henceforth GIM, combine 24 attributes of corporate governance, provided by the IRRC to create an index which proxies for shareholder rights to examine the relation between governance and equity returns. The paper finds that democratic portfolios earned significantly higher returns, were valued higher, and had better operating performance. Firms with strong shareholder rights are found to have risk-adjusted returns that are 8.5% higher than those of firms with low shareholder rights. However, they do not find significant operating underperformance when measured by return on equity. An entrenchment index consisting of six of the twenty-four IRRC governance provisions is constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) and found to substantially drive the GIM results. Brown and Caylor (2005) use ISS governance attributes, similar to this paper, and create a parsimonious index based on seven provisions that include both internal and external mechanisms. They find that their Gov-7 index fully explains the relation between governance and value. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) and Brown and Caylor (2005) , conclude that only a subset of governance attributes are related to firm value. The importance of both internal and external mechanisms is also documented by Cremers and Nair (2004 Ribstein (2002) and Romano (2004) ). The limited empirical research does show that SOX has had a significant impact on publicly traded firms. In a comprehensive study Linck, Netter and Yang (2005) find that the costs associated with corporate boards, such as directors' fee, have increased substantially. The costs are particularly high for small firms.
Boards have become larger and more independent; more firms separate the CEO and Chairman role; and more firms have established nominating and governance committees.
The market reaction to news about SOX has been studied using an events study approach by Li, Pincus and Rego (2004) , Rezaee and Jain (2005) 
II. Governance Attributes and New Regulations
Corporate governance covers many facets of the relation across stakeholders that may be associated with firm value. Using the ISS data, we consider 64 governance attributes that may impact the relation between governance and value. These attributes are classified into eight subcategories. The number of attributes assigned to each subcategory are: board composition and structure -22, charter and by-laws -11, compensation -10, state of incorporation -7, ownership -3, audit -4, progressive -6 and director education -1. The information contained in each of these categories is compiled to determine an overall governance rating for each firm.
The weight of each category is primarily determined by the number of possible outcomes in each attribute and is not merely a yes or no response. The detail allows us to evaluate the relative importance of each category of corporate governance during our sample period. In addition to these six provisions, the new regulations had several other requirements, for example, certification of the accuracy of financial statements by the CEO, and that the audit committee must consist of directors who are financially literate. With the ISS data we can directly examine six of the new regulations. It is important to point out that the ISS criteria are not exactly the same as the regulation mandated. For example, the ISS definition of independent director is more stringent than that mandated by regulation. Another example is that new regulations only require that firms adopt corporate governance guidelines but ISS in addition requires that they be published. The ISS criterion not only requires the audit, compensation and nominating committee to be composed solely of independent directors but also requires that each committee be able to hire its own advisors. These higher standards held by ISS could impact the inferences because companies at the minimum level of compliance could lead to some crosssectional differences even after compliance.
We do believe that the six governance attributes covered serve as a good proxy for new regulations. Some companies already had these provisions in place before they were mandated by the new regulations. Therefore, we are able to examine the relation between these governance attributes and firm value in the period before regulation required them. Other control mechanisms, for example, CEO certification of financial statements, was not being done by any firm during 2001, therefore it would not have been possible to study these attributes before the regulation was mandated. increased considerably but was still far from 100%. As discussed earlier, this is quite possible because certain companies were allowed a longer time period to comply, some others were exempt from the new regulations, and ISS definitions may differ.
III. Data and Methodology
As mentioned earlier, the data on the 64 governance attributes is obtained from ISS. ISS Based on the 64 attributes, eight sub-categories are analyzed: 1) board of directors, 2) audit, 3) charter/by-laws, 4) anti-takeover provisions, 5) ownership, 6) executive and director compensation, 7) progressive practices, and 8) director education. Board attributes attempt to capture the aspects of the board of directors that relate to board independence, composition of committees, size, transparency and how work is conducted; Audit includes questions regarding independence of the audit committee and the role of auditors; Charter refers to anti-takeover provisions, capital structure rules and how changes can be made to these rules; Ownership is concerned with the ownership structure of the firm by directors and the guidelines thereof;
Compensation deals with executive and director compensation on issues related to options, stock ownership and loans and how these types of compensation are determined and monitored; and
Progressive practices include questions related to board appointments, board review, external advisors and CEO succession plan. Table 1 then REG has a value of zero. The value of REG for a firm that meets all the six new regulations will be six. As discussed earlier, several firms met many of these requirements even before they were mandated by new regulations. Next, we examine the relation between the governance attributes and firm value.
IV. Governance and Firm Value
The governance attributes adopted by firms may vary by firm characteristics as well as industries. Therefore we next examine variations in governance across firm size and industries.
IV.A. Differences in Governance across Firm Size
We divide the sample into deciles based on 2004 market capitalization in order to examine the differences in governance across firm size. Panel A of Table 2 shows the composite governance score and also the score for each of the eight sub-categories for each size group.
Gov 64 has a score of 31.34 for all the firms in our sample. There is a monotonic increase in the governance score with the smallest firms having a score of 26.54 and the largest group of firms having a score of 37.86. The five smallest deciles have scores that are significantly less than the mean for the full sample at the 1% level while the four largest deciles have scores that are significantly higher than the average for the sample.
The increasing monotonic pattern is generally observed for the sub-categories, Board, Audit, Compensation, Progressive and Ownership. The pattern that larger firms have higher governance scores is not necessarily observed for the remaining three categories of charter and by-laws, state of incorporation, and director education. Based on these results, it is not surprising that Linck, Netter and Yang (2005) find the costs of compliance to be much higher for smaller firms. We find that even at the end of 2004, major differences continue to exist between the governance of small and large firms. These results suggest that complying with new governance regulations can be a very costly burden for small firms. It might also result in fewer smaller companies going public. We also estimate a multivariate regression (not reported) with the composite governance score, Gov 64 as the dependant variable and industry dummies as independent variables in order to examine whether governance varies across industries. After controlling for several firm-specific variables, many of the industry dummies are still significant implying cross-sectional differences in governance based on industry characteristics. Industries such as utilities and pharmaceuticals and biotechnology have a positive and significant coefficient. It can be concluded that 1) governance mechanisms vary across industries; 2) regulated industries tend to have stronger governance; 3) composite governance scores do not necessarily match along sub-categories of governance. Surprisingly, banks are regulated but they tend to have lower governance scores.
IV.B. Differences in Governance across Industries
This may be because banks are more focused on a different set of regulatory requirements.
Based on these findings, we control for firm size and industry differences when analyzing the relation between governance and firm value. The new regulations are mandated across the board for all publicly traded companies and do not account for differences across firm size or across industries.
IV. C. Composite Governance and Value
Similar to previous work in the corporate governance literature (see, GIM (2003), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) ) we use Tobin's Q as the measure of valuation. We use both firm Q, denoted as Q, and industry-adjusted Q (adjusted by industry median), denoted as Q-adj, as our measures of the dependant variable. Q is defined as ((total assets + market value of equity -total common equity -deferred taxes)/ total assets). Qadj is industry median-adjusted using the 24 ISS defined industries. The following model is estimated:
Where, G i is a proxy for firm-specific governance, and F i are a set of firm characteristics. The firm characteristics included for control purposes are log of book value of assets (SIZE), inclusion in the S&P 500 index (SP500), dividend yield (YIELD) and sales growth (SGROWTH).
These variables have been found to be associated with value (see for example, GIM (2003), Shin and Stulz (2000) , Morck and Yang (2001) The coefficient on our governance index is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all four models in Table 3 . The mean and median values of Q for our sample are 1.56 and 1.13, respectively. A coefficient of 0.04 on Gov 64 implies that if a firm adopts just one additional governance attribute then the Tobin's Q for the median firm increases by 4%.
Therefore the relationship is not just statistically significant but is also economically significant.
We can conclude that firm value is positively associated with firm-specific corporate governance.
Not surprisingly, the coefficient on Size is negative and significant in all four models.
Consistent with Morck and Yang (2001) we find that inclusion in the S&P 500 is associated with higher valuation. Our governance index is positive and significant in all four models. Therefore, we can conclude that firm value is positively associated with firm-specific corporate governance, firm size, and with inclusion of firms in the S&P 500. We find no significant relation with dividend or sales growth. The results remain the same if we do not winsorize Q, however, using the winsorized sample does result in a considerably higher R 2 in the range of 12%-22%. The results are similar for 2003 and are not reported. In addition to the control variables included in Table 3 , for robustness in unreported regressions, we also include other control variables used in the literature: capital expenditure to assets, return on assets, debt/assets and R&D to sales. The governance results remain the same.
We repeat the analysis using the GIM shareholder rights governance index for our sample period and do not find it to be significant. 7 Our results may be different for a number of reasons: 1) Our governance index is much broader than GIM's shareholder index; 2) using the GIM index reduces our sample by more than half because GIM's index is available for far fewer firms; 3) the time periods in the two studies are different, we are examining data for a different and more recent time period; and 4) based on the objective of each paper, the methodologies used are different.
IV.D. Governance Sub-Categories and Value
Next, in order to isolate the impact of each of the subcategories we replace the composite In summary, we have so far shown that governance is important for firm valuation which is consistent with previous work. We have also shown that there are differences in governance across firms and there is a significant industry component to corporate governance. The difference in governance across industry is important since it may indicate that policy makers may want to consider the implications of governance decisions at the industry level rather than across all firms. Finally, we have shown that sub-categories of governance have a significant impact on firm value after controlling for the industry effect. Next, we focus on an examination of the six governance attributes that were mandated by new regulations and are also included in our set of 64 governance attributes.
V. New Regulations
The Six governance attributes targeted by the new regulations are part of the ISS dataset and therefore we are able to study these attributes before and after the new regulations went into effect. Table 5 shows the number of companies that met these requirements over the period, 
V.A. New Regulations and Firm Value
In order to directly examine the relation between these new regulations and firm value we follow an approach similar to Bebchuk and Cohen (2005 and ∆REG is 0.43. This positive correlation again suggests that firms not only adopted new regulatory changes but at the same time they also improved governance in other areas not mandated by regulation. Table 6 shows the relation between firm value measured as industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, and the two governance variables, Gov 58 and REG, as explanatory variables. The ISS measures are more stringent.
In studies of corporate governance there is always concern about endogeneity in that it could be the case that firms with high Tobin's Q have good governance rather than the reverse .
The differences in year-by-year results above suggest that endogeneity is less of an issue in our here. We will discuss this issue further in the robustness section.
V.B. Changes in Governance and Firm Value
In addition to REG, we estimate an alternative measure of compliance with new regulations, GAP. GAP is the proportional increase in REG needed to reach regulatory compliance. In order to determine the extent of the penalty for firms that are further away from meeting all regulations we construct GAP. This proportional measure is different from using REG because REG only captures the number of regulations for which the firm is in compliance.
This distinction is an alternate measure that captures the specific effects of compliance with new regulation across a continuous scale.
GAP = (7-NREG)/NREG; and NREG is (1+REG).
As discussed earlier, REG is an index of new regulations calculated by summing the six governance provisions that were mandated. A one has been added to REG to avoid dividing by zero. The maximum value of GAP can be six and the minimum value can be zero. In addition to annual regressions, we also present results of pooled regressions in Table 8 . In order to further examine the changes before and after the new regulations, we create a dummy variable DPOST that equals one if the period is post-regulations else the value of DPOST is zero. In the results reported, the post-regulation period is considered to be 2004 and the pre-regulation period is 2002 and 2003. 9 The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. In addition to DPOST, in column 1 of Table 9 we include GAP and DPOST* GAP as explanatory variables. In the pre-regulations period firms may have voluntarily adopted the governance attributes that were later mandated by regulation. The coefficient on GAP is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that firms that did not voluntarily adopt the governance 
Columns 1 & 2 of
V.C. New Regulations and Board Independence
Next, we attempt to identify which of the six governance attributes included in the new regulations index were most relevant by estimating six different regressions. The annual analysis of We also repeat the analysis by including all six individual regulations in the same model and again find that no single regulation dominates consistently across years.
The new regulations only require that the board be composed of majority independent directors. But we also have more detailed information on board independence: we know whether the board consists of greater than or equal to 50% or 67% or 75% or 90% independent board members. We replace the dummy associated with this regulation that uses the 50% cutoff with additional dummies that capture other cutoffs. In 2003 both the 50% and 67% cutoffs are positive and significant. After the regulations have been mandated, in 2004 in the reduced model the 50% cutoff is negative and significant at the 10% level, the 67% cutoff is positive and significant at the 10% level, and the 75% and 90% cutoff is positive and significant at the 5% level. The results are not reported here but they suggest that after the regulations mandated the 50% requirement, companies that had an even higher proportion of board independence were valued higher.
VI. Robustness
Previously we addressed the issue of endogeneity by using governance in 2002 to predict the firm value in 2004. This shows that governance and value are not endogenously determined.
It may be argued that because we are using a relatively short period of time and the firm management is likely to remain the same, this is not a strong enough test. For robustness in this section we conducted a 2SLS analysis to more directly test for endogeneity. 
VII. Conclusions
Attention on the quality of corporate governance has increased substantially over the past several years driven by a number of corporate scandals. These scandals have driven the U.S.
Congress as well as stock exchanges to implement certain corporate governance rules that are targeted at investor protection and strengthening internal control procedures. This has resulted in heated debate over the costs and benefits of the new regulations and whether they were needed or if the market was quite capable of addressing these issues.
This paper examines the relation between the new regulations and firm value. First, the study shows that corporate governance is important for firm value and supports prior work on the value of governance. Second, the paper finds that there are statistically significant cross-sectional differences in governance at the firm and the industry level. For example, smaller firms have very different governance structures than larger firms. Therefore, adopting the new regulations will be far more expensive for smaller firms than larger firms. This raises the question of whether the one-size-fits-all approach to governance is appropriate. Third, the paper shows that new regulations mandated by Congress and exchanges were associated with higher firm value.
These governance attributes are reflected in the valuation of firms that adopted them voluntarily.
The results are statistically and economically significant. In this sense, our findings suggest that the new regulations did target relevant governance attributes. However, the analysis also indicates that the markets were already doing their job and rewarding firms that had better quality governance. Therefore, it is not clear that new regulations were needed. As expected, relative to the pre-regulations period, in the post-regulations period the relation between governance attributes addressed by regulation and firm value is much weaker.
We also cannot rule out the fact that more valuable firms opt for better governance. As discussed by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) , simultaneity issues make it difficult to interpret the results with regard to causal links. However, the paper suggests that better governance causes and not merely reflect higher firm value. Our results are consistent with their conclusions. We also recognize that Congress and the exchanges mandated new regulations to protect individual investors and improve transparency and accountability in U.S. markets. Therefore, it is possible that governance attributes unrelated to firm valuation are important for other purposes.
Figure 1 Percentage of Firms Meeting the Six New Regulations
Board Independence reflects the provision that the board must consist of a majority of independent directors. Executive Session reflects the provision that non-management directors must have an executive session without management. Nominating Committee reflects the provision that a nominating committee must have only independent directors. Compensation Committee reflects the provision that a compensation committee must have only independent directors. Audit Committee reflects the provision that an audit committee must have only independent directors and a minimum of three members. Governance Guidelines reflects the provision that firms must adopt corporate governance guidelines. Mean governance scores are reported by firm size (market capitalization) in Panel A and by industry in Panel B. Gov 64 is the governance index based on summation of the 64 governance attributes that are considered to be minimally acceptable. Board, indicates the board of directors attributes; Charter is the charter and by laws attributes; Audit is audit-related attributes, State is provisions of the state of incorporation, Compensation Relates to executive and director compensation, Progressive are qualitative factors based on progressive practices, Ownership is officers and directors ownership of the firm, Education is director education. N is the number of firms in the industry. The t-statistic measures the difference between the composite governance rating Gov 64 , for the group versus the mean for all firms. *, **, *** reflects the significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. . Q is Tobin's Q defined as ((total assets + market value of equity -total common equity -deferred taxes)/ total assets). Q-adj is industry median-adjusted using the 24 ISS defined industries. Gov 64 , is the governance index based on summation of the 64 governance that are considered to be minimally acceptable. The control variables are: SIZE, natural log of assets; SP500, a dummy equal to one if the company is included in the S&P 500 Index else the value is zero; YLD is dividend yield; and SGROWTH is sales growth. Columns 1 & 3 include only size as the control variable; columns 2 & 4 also include SP500, YIELD and SGROWTH for control purposes. Columns 1 & 2 include industry dummies for control but the coefficients are not reported here. Tobin's Q is winsorized at 1% at the top and bottom of the distribution. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. This table shows the relation between firm value, measured as Tobin's Q, and the gap in regulatory compliance. The dependent variable is Q-adj, industry median-adjusted using the 24 ISS defined industries. The gap in regulatory compliance is measured by GAP. GAP equals (7-NREG)/NREG where NREG is (1+REG). REG is an index of new regulations calculated by summing the six governance provisions that were mandated. A one has been added to REG to avoid dividing by zero. Gov 58 is an index of the 64 total attributes minus the six new provisions. The control variables are: SIZE, natural log of assets; SP500, a dummy equal to one if the company is included in the S&P 500 Index else the value is zero; YIELD is dividend yield; and SGROWTH is sales growth. Columns 1, 3 & 5 include only SIZE as the control variable; columns 2, 4 & 6 also include SP500, YLD and SGROWTH for control purposes. Tobin's Q is winsorized at 1% at the top and bottom of the distribution. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. This table is a pooled regression showing the relation between firm value, measured as Tobin's Q, and the gap in regulatory compliance. The dependent variable is Q-adj, industry median-adjusted using the 24 ISS defined industries. The gap in regulatory compliance is measured by GAP. GAP equals (7-NREG)/NREG where NREG is (1+REG). REG is an index of new regulations calculated by summing the six governance provisions that were mandated. A one has been added to REG to avoid dividing by zero. Gov 58 is an index of the 64 total attributes minus the six new provisions. The control variables are: SIZE, natural log of assets; SP500, a dummy equal to one if the company is included in the S&P 500 Index else the value is zero; YIELD is dividend yield; and SGROWTH is sales growth. Columns 1, 3 & 5 include only SIZE as the control variable; columns 2, 4 & 6 also include SP500, YLD and SGROWTH for control purposes. Tobin's Q is winsorized at 1% at the top and bottom of the distribution. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 40.29 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 9 Pre-and Post New Regulations This table is a pooled regression showing the relation between firm value measured as Tobin's Q, and the gap in regulatory compliance. The gap in regulatory compliance is measured by GAP. GAP equals (7-NREG)/NREG where NREG is (1+REG). REG is an index of new regulations calculated by summing the six governance provisions that were mandated. A one has been added to REG to avoid dividing by zero. Gov 58 is an index of the 64 total attributes minus the six new provisions. DPOST equals one for the post-regulatory period, assumed to be 2004, and equals zero for the pre-regulatory period assumed to be 2002 and 2003. The control variables are: SIZE, natural log of assets; SP500, a dummy equal to one if the company is included in the S&P 500 Index else the value is zero; YIELD is dividend yield; and SGROWTH is sales growth. Columns 1, 2 are results of pooled regressions and columns 3 & 4 are with firm fixed effects. Tobin's Q is winsorized at 1% at the top and bottom of the distribution. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
